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Abstract: Elements comprising this Review of Disability Studies issue title - Human Security, 
Social Cohesion, Disability – invite reflection on inter-relationships and tensions: Security with 
or against impairment; insider/outsider status; impairment as impropriety; health definitions; 
measures (DALYs); elimination; professional discourse; bridging social capital; possibilities and 
constraints on flourishing; and concrete global examples. 
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The elements comprising the title of this forum of RDS include a goal (human security), a 
mediating dimension (social cohesion), and a specific lens (disability). Disability here indicates 
the negative impacts of an environment – physical or social - in interaction with impairment or 
human variation (Walker, 1993). 
 
Thus framed, disability and human security are inversely related.1 Human security is 
multi-dimensional (physical, economic, health-related, educational-functional, axiological, 
spiritual). Its aim is “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human 
freedoms and human fulfillment” (Commission on Security, 2003). It transpires or fails in 
community to a significant extent through social cohesion - a process dynamically informing 
social inclusion and exclusion through distributions of values, resources and actions (see Jensen, 
2002). 
 
In the horizon of this RDS issue lies more than the security of persons with impairments 
or atypical variations: Implications inform human security generally, both deductively (who is 
included) and inductively (the particular case). Examples include the intersection of food 
sovereignty, poverty and disability (V. Hiranandini); literacy and disability in South Africa (C. 
Dube); and the context of community-based rehabilitation engendering social capital and social 
cohesion between persons with and without impairments in a community in Thailand (T. 
Cheausuwantavee). 
 
Whether framed via human rights (United Nations, 2006), hierarchies of needs (Maslow, 
1943), or conditions for flourishing given (or deviating from) natural goods, capacities and 
capabilities (Foote (2003), Sen (1993), Nussbaum (2006)), the security and social well-being of 
persons with impairments in a society provides a criterion for social health with positive external 
effects across the society - presupposing an inclusive orientation reflected in personal, private- 
and public-institutional commitments. This may be applied contextually, such as in considering a 
democratization of place in socially equitable community planning (K.M. Christensen). 
 
Security vs. Impairment? 
 
It is not trivial to ask which humans count in a society in matters of human security. 
Historically race and ethnicity provided dominant frames for exclusion and awareness of the 
same, with impairment subdominant. The dyad of security and impairment is double-edged to 
the present moment: even the presence of impairment can be viewed and represented as an 
opportunity cost to economic efficiency or as impediment to personal happiness for first and 
third parties. In measures from comparative cohorts, persons without an impairment or condition 
routinely project a greater negative impact on a person’s life than those actually having a 
condition (Gabriel, Kneeland, Melton, Moncur, Ettinger, & Tosteson, 1999). 
 
Should an impairment be congenital (whether or not genetic), its presence may be framed 
as a threat to hereditary or intergenerational security. This thought has driven both ancient and 
more contemporary eugenics (Pernick, 1996). Such variations are also framed as a threat to 
familial security (the disabled family under lack of social support). These “threats” may be 
managed societally through increasingly predictive technology, avoiding downstream costs 
through prenatal elimination as when modeled under assumption of a “normal replacement 
child” (Miller, Ransom, Ayoub, Krivchenia, & Evans, 2000). Additionally replaced is a 
contrasting network of relationships and values (Koch, 2004). 
 
In the recent routinized drama of American presidential politics, an unroutine, if 
conventional, public introduction of a candidate’s family included an infant with trisomy 21 
(Down Syndrome). This, linked with the candidate’s restrictive views on abortion, raised 
concerns among some medical professionals in the U.S. (Parikh, 2008) and Canada (Weeks, 
2008) regarding the implications (if not propriety) of the presence of this infant-other in the 
public square. One such response is illuminating from the standpoint of insider/outsider 
positions, social cohesion, implications of professional discourse, and the possibilities and 
constraints of social well-being. 
 
Responding to the rupture, physician Parikh (2008) instructs that, “[C]hildren with Down 
Syndrome have a variety of problems, starting with a distinct look …” A distinct look however is 
a problem to a social other before it is one for the person with DS whose affective development 
may be amplified through appropriate interaction with others (Carvejal & Iglesias, 2002).  
 
Parikh casts limits of financial and emotional resources as an individual parental crisis 
not as a societal deficit that is impaired social cohesion with general implications for human 
security. The conclusion tendered is that a privileged individual (such as the candidate) may 
afford such a child “financially and emotionally” while this “may not be the case for other 
families who have to struggle to balance work with home and family” - implying families 
welcoming a member with DS must not similarly struggle to the same degree to balance work 
with home and family.  
 
Alluding to a circa 90% prenatal elimination rate, “[R]abid anti-choice activists have 
called that trend eugenics via medicine. But try telling that to a mother who is told early on in her 
pregnancy that she will be raising a child who will have a host of medical and developmental 
problems, requiring intense medical and social attention for the rest of his or her life. It can be 
tragic and nearly impossible news to bear” (Parikh, 2008).  
 
Paradoxically for that analysis, a study of postpartum-only DS diagnoses sheds a 
different light on the experiential structuring of receiving such an unexpected presence, focusing 
on predictors of more or less positive experiences. Factors significantly predicting decreased 
positive experience for such an arrival, higher levels of fright and higher levels of anxiety were 
fewer prior pregnancies, higher levels of education, higher income, and physician negativity 
(Skotko, 2005). 
 
Perceptions of adequacy (implicitly embedded within networks of social support) being 
inversely related to income and education flies in the face of common assumptions regarding 
education moderating attitudes towards human variation and income as expanding capacity. 
Skotko surmises: 
 
“Perhaps these mothers were more likely to live in social circles in which a disability 
would be viewed as unfortunate or unpopular. In addition to or as an alternative, these women 
might have had more demanding jobs, which caused them to worry about how they would find 
time to raise a child with a disability” (p. 73). 
 
Skotko found “almost no” reports of suicidal ideation associated with the unexpected 
news. Those few who did have such ideation notably reported two physician communicative 
behaviours: “their physicians had pitied them […] or emphasized the negative aspects of DS” (p. 
72). The pitying physician was also most systematically significantly associated with not having 
a positive birth experience; not being told about positive aspects of DS; being told about the 
negative; not emphasizing positive aspects, but rather the negative; not providing sufficient 
telephone numbers of parents who also had such a child (disabling social support); not providing 
enough up-to-date printed materials on DS; receiving printed materials not emphasizing positive 
aspects, but rather negative, or not receiving materials presenting an equal mix of both; receiving 
unhelpful/difficult to understand materials; being frightened; being anxious; feeling negative; 
and having no prior knowledge about this genetic condition (as illustrated in Table 6, Skotko, p. 
71). 
 
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AGOC) now recommends 
both universal screening for trisomy 21 (Down Syndrome) at any age of pregnancy and routinely 
offering odds ratios (ACOG, 2007). From the standpoint of Disability Adjusted Life Years 
(DALYs) under the analysis of the World Bank, eliminating Down syndrome falls conceptually 
under disease control (World Bank 2002a; 2002b). 
 
Counting Disability 
 
A DALY is a composite loss indicator combining a measure of premature mortality given 
condition x with duration lived with that condition, providing some measure also of durative 
nonfatal condition impacts that can be summed across a population (A comparison of measures 
reflecting models of health and disability is provided by Wolbring [2005, pp. 74-85]). For any 
suspected impairment or variation correlated to shorter lifespan or functional limitation, prenatal 
elimination adds 0 to DALY population (societal) totals despite a 100% loss of benchmark 
standard years that were selected against precisely due to a condition or a probability of a 
condition intersecting values and social structures.2 
 
Murray and Acharya (1997) state, “[I]ndividuals [sic] perception of their own health may 
not coincide with their actual health status” (p. 708). DALYs exclude nonbiological dimensions 
and determinants of well-being. Including only age and sex personal characteristics as 
differentiating elements within the calculation is egalitarian in terms of not assigning differential 
value to, say, productivity correlates not related to age. “The DALY approach does not take into 
account the likelihood of the fact that effects of illness can be worsened by lack of income, 
friends and public services etc. because the use of DALYs is to guide public policy that affects 
directly or indirectly the onset and the treatment of diseases” (p. 723). One must look elsewhere 
for social cohesion and alternative sector investments. “In fact, the concept of DALYs avoids 
any notion of one being satisfied with one’s health. Rather it seeks to measure health by the 
degree of deprivation experienced by a person in being able to use one’s own body” (p.724). 
 
Social Cohesion and Whose Health? 
 
At the intersection of human security and disability the mediating dimension, social 
cohesion, is often double-edged. Social cohesion can be framed normatively or descriptively. 
Normatively it may imply inclusion or access to social goods with secondary impacts toward 
conformity or diversity. Descriptively social cohesion (invoking norms) is also possible on the 
basis of exclusion. Regarding the human rights of persons with disabilities this is perhaps most 
extreme in North Korea at the ideological intersection of racial mysticism and radical autarchy 
(juche). In October, 2006, a North Korean physician who defected, Ri Kwang-chol, reported 
“there are no people with physical defects in North Korea” (Sheridan, 2006). Medicins sans 
Frontiers left North Korea in 1998 when denied access to so-called 9-27 camps where disabled 
children were reportedly exiled. From the present issue, M. S. Glennon’s title Making Social 
Cohesion or Marking the Human Security Threat applies. 
 
Glennon analyzes U.S. contexts where rival sources of social capital sought by 
developmentally disabled persons collide with ostensibly benevolent institutions intent on their 
social integration and normalization. He raises to the fore (via M. Foucault, G. Deleuzes and F. 
Guattari) collisions between authorized and rival non-authorized social capital. 
 
Where typical capacities are taken to be the normative root of minimal human value (or 
tokens of membership in personhood eliciting protective claims upon society) the absence of one 
or more capacity weighs against positive social solidarity – on a particular utilitarian scale such 
may be considered a misinvestment of resources and sentiments where both subject and 
solidarity can be pathologized (Joseph, 2005).3 
 
Koch (2004) points to rival paradigms informing moral language and societal attitudes 
towards humans who are atypical or vulnerable through iconic representatives Peter Singer and 
Harriet McBryde-Johnson. For McBryde-Johnson (per Koch a “critic from difference”) human 
being is relational, irreducible, and beyond exchange. Whatever the impairments, diminished 
capacities, or nontypical structures, quality of lives (pl.) in relationships of care (personhood in 
community) is of defining import, with failures to support being social failures and harms, 
contrasted to Singer’s (“a critic of difference”) isolating quality of life (sg.) of enumerated 
capacities upon which inclusion in, or exclusion from, personhood, societal protection, or 
expenditure of resources is based: the greater the impairment the more diminished any 
“substantive” as opposed to “sentimental” justification for social protection and investment. The 
distinction of views is of import for evaluating the health of society, likewise relational, not 
merely biological, at the intersection of human security, social cohesion and disability - 
differently situating the potentials of community (Gemeinschaft), diversity, and autonomy in 
society (Gesellschaft). 
 
M.A. Burke advances “operationalizing human security and human rights through a 
dynamic model of health” addressing health development models and WHO’s asymptotic 
definition of health (“a complete state of physical, mental and social well-being and not merely 
the absence of disease and infirmity,” WHO, 1946) in the context of a project with Kyrgyzstan. 
Ought a person effectively empowered to work around an impairment be considered unhealthy? 
Are species of atypical, idiosyncratic adaptations to be viewed as essentially different in nature 
from nearly ubiquitous adaptations likewise indicating inadequacy of a human structure to 
flourish in an unmediated environment (for example, generic dependence on shoes raises no 
eyebrows in the health derby, only need of “adaptive” shoes, in the context of DALYs)?  
 
The WHO constitution preamble casts its nets wide to articulate principles “basic to the 
happiness, harmonious relations and security of all peoples” (WHO, 1946), citing “the health of 
all peoples” as fundamental for achieving peace and security, dependent on cooperation of both 
states and individuals. It continues toward social cohesion: the promotion and protection of 
health is of value to all; unequal development is a common danger; the healthy development of 
the child; distributing benefits of health related knowledge; informed opinion and active public 
co-operation (participation?), and state responsibility for adequate health and social measures. It 
also famously declares enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health a fundamental right 
“of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social 
condition.” In essence Burke’s socially situated dynamic model of health and functional well-
being additionally appends under WHO’s “without distinction” impairment and variation - an 
omission of note in 1946 given the then recent history of targeting persons precisely due to 
variation and impairment. Human security and social cohesion necessary for human flourishing, 
with or without impairments, invites a broader purview, as does this issue, for ongoing 
engagement. 
 
 
Kirk C. Allison, Ph.D., M.S., is the Program Director of the Program in Human Rights and 
Health of the University of Minnesota School of Public Health and lecturer in the Division of 
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Endnotes 
 
1The 1980 WHO International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps (ICIDH) distinguished 
between impairment (“any loss or abnormality of psychological, physiological or anatomical structure or function”), 
disability (“any restriction or lack (resulting from an impairment) of ability to perform an activity in the manner or 
within the range considered normal for a human being” – ‘in the manner’ pathologizes efficacious nontypical 
functional modes) - and handicap (“a disadvantage for a given individual, resulting from an impairment or a 
disability, that limits or prevents the fulfillment of a role that is normal (depending on age, sex, and social and 
cultural factors) for that individual”) (WHO, 1980 in Yaruss, 1998). Disability highlights the additional role of 
contingent cultural and environmental constraints in disabling an individual. The ICIDH-2 shifts terminology from 
disability and handicap recasting such in terms of activity restriction and participation restriction, integrating 
medical and social models into a “biopsychosocial” model. The ICIDH-2 was then renamed International 
Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (WHO, 2001a). Under the new model, health conditions, 
personal factors and environment impact body structure and function, activities and participation (WHO, 2001b). 
2If prenatally considered, the time-with-disability-component limits to 0 while premature mortality maximizes. The 
DALY benchmark lifespan for its mortality measure is the highest national life expectancy (Japan) (Murray, 1994). 
More specifically the comparison is to a model life-table adjusted slightly for estimated biological survival 
differences and weighting different ages unequally according to a functional estimation of value such that birth = 0, 
age 10=1.0, 25 ca. 1.5, and 100 ca. 0.3 (Murray, 1994, Figure 4). Murray and Acharya (1997) justify age weightings 
instrumentally: the “well-being of some age groups…is instrumental in making society flourish.” The morbidity 
measure originally assigned weights 0..1 to 6 classes (baskets) of functional limitation characteristics. A revision 
(1996) assigned weight partitions to conditions in 7 categories. Murray and Acharya (1997) report revised elicited 
weights (in place of US expert panel estimates 1994) using international regional health care provider informants in 
a recursive deliberative process “to evaluate the average individual with the condition described taking into account 
the average social response or milieu for the world” generating a rank order of condition severity for treated and 
untreated forms of a condition. The 1994 functional weighting categorization appears much closer to a capabilities 
or functionings approach than the 1996 condition categorization, despite claims of the 1997 article. 
3An instructive example of this is found in the context of the euthanasia debate in the American Journal of 
Psychiatry in 1942. The accompanying editorial in favor of euthanizing children with significant impairments 
pathologizes the attachments of parents: “A third variety of reaction results from an accusing sense of obligation on 
the part of the parents towards the defective creature they have caused to be born. The extreme devotion and care 
bestowed upon the defective child, even with sacrifice of advantages for its normal brothers and sisters is a matter of 
common observation. This position is understandable, but to the impersonal observer may appear to partake of the 
morbid” (Anonymous, as cited in Joseph, 2005). “Impersonal” here denotes without relationship.
 
